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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
H. T. DAVIS 
A few months ago I sat at a banquet in a room of mirrors. The 
group of guests communicated with one another by spoken words. 
But as I sat and looked down the corridor of reflected images of 
ourselves, I could not help but feel that a vision of the great past 
of the human race was presented to my eye. As far as one could 
see, a vast assemblage of human forms was visible and I felt that 
in this little instant of the present time we were accompanied by 
the shadows of all those who had lived before us. There in a 
distant image I caught a glimpse of the lofty figures of the Athen-
ean school, Aristotle walking among the olive trees ; Hippocrates, 
probing into the cause of human ills from which he formulated 
an oath that in later times was to be adopted as one of the most 
idealistic principles of the race. A little nearer we view the 
scholars of the great University of Alexandria. There is Euclid 
reflecting upon the theorems in his immortal "Elements." Vv e see 
also the image of Aristarchus, measuring the distance to the sun 
and moon, and Aratosthenes, centuries ahead of his times, proving 
that the earth is spherical and measuring its diameter. And there 
is Archimedes laying the foundations of mechanics, and Hero with 
his steam engine, and Ptolemy reflecting upon the mystery of the 
planets. A little nearer our own times we see the mystic figure of 
Galileo, defying the prejudice of his age and proving that the 
earth is but a moving atom in a universe of unimaginable magni-
tude. And there is Newton penning the immortal passages of his 
"Principia." And there also are Faraday and 1faxwell, Wallace 
and Darwin, Koch and Pasteur, Lamarck and Werner, and all the 
other immortals who by their careful studies and brilliant general-
izations were to found that thing which we have called by the 
simple name of Science. 
And then I turned toward the other wall of mirrors and again I 
saw another vast assemblage of human beings stretching far into 
the future. There in epitome was the future of the human race. 
And there, could we but recognize them, were another Euclid and 
another Newton and another Pasteur, who would find things about 
which we now only vaguely dream, and who would assert principles 
of supreme importance to the race. 
59 1
Davis: The Philosophy of Science
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1939
60 IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE [VoL. XLVI 
And as I reflected upon these matters a page in uniform crossed 
the room and there I saw a great column of marching men, whose 
shadow obscured some of the faces that I have mentioned. And 
it occurred to me that a great human problem was involved also 
in the development of science. Science, objective, mathematical, 
idealistic in the highest meaning of that word, is not a thing apart 
from the mechanism of human actions and human hopes and 
human fears. A philosophy of science must be created, which will 
state the ultimate objectives of these men whom I have mentioned 
and act as a star toward which we in the present time may go, and 
which will guide those future colleagues of ours who are at 
present only images. 
Science to the great mass of people is mysterious and terrifying. 
To prove this one needs but follow its slow development and wit-
ness even in our own day the many prejudices that hamper pro-
gress. The masses, having little knowledge of the history of 
science and of past states of social development, but dimly know 
that the present high level of human living is due in major part to 
the conquests of science. But when there is a decline in present 
standards, then science is at fault and must be blamed. By this I 
mean to say that science is something of an aristocratic domain 
and that many cannot enter its portals. Its laws and principles 
cannot at present and perhaps never can be stated in a form that 
will be appreciated by all the people. Therefore, it is an important 
matter for us as the high priests in the temple to pause a moment 
from the specific problems of the laboratory and to formulate the 
principles upon which we work. This formulation is what I shall 
call the philosophy of science. 
I shall therefore discuss with you a few of the principles which 
have appealed to me as being among our most cherished ones. No 
man can approach this problem of formulation with out prejudice, 
since he has channels of interest which direct his thinking. After 
a training mainly devoted to mathematics and physics, I have more 
recently turned to one of the most intriguing lines of recent spec-
ulation. This is the study of human actions as they relate to 
economics. My views are thus highly colored by this sudden shock 
of attempting to apply the rigid principles of physics, and the cold 
logic of mathematics, to the erratic and mysterious behavior of 
human beings. Hence my formulation of the philosophy of science 
may not agree in all, or even in large part, with that of many 
of you. 
Let us start with the first principle, which we may call the 
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principle of logic. This is the cardinal principle of mathematics. 
It assumes that there exists a process, external to the forms of 
the world and to the will of man, which leads from a set of post-
ulates to a set of conclusions. These conclusions are inevitable and 
irrefrangible. God himself cannot change them. It is for this 
reason that the phrase "mathematically proved" has come to have 
such conclusive and complete finality. 
In recent years there has been some rescrutiny of the principle, 
and we shall take .a moment to indicate some examples. Thus, all 
of you were probably taught in school that the sum of the angles 
of a triangle is equal to 180 degrees. One did not need to take 
this on the instructor's authority, since there was a logical proof 
of the proposition. But now it is gradually corning into common 
knowledge that this theorem is not true, if we give a somewhat 
liberal definition to the word true. On the other hand, it is not 
false. The sum of the angles of a triangle may be either greater 
than 180 degrees, equal to 180 degrees, or less than 180 degrees 
entirely according to how one may feel about the matter. Gauss, 
who was among those first to observe this strange situation, was 
so impressed by the matter that he actually made a triangulation in 
the neighborhood of his home to measure the variation of the sum 
of the angles from the Euclidean estimate. Vv e now know that 
this was a futile attempt because mensuration of terrestrial dimen-
sions is Euclidean within experimental error. It is quite another 
thing when applied to the great distances of astronomical space. 
Another curious example is related to the sum 1 + 1 = 2. This 
identity is learned in childhood and we have an unreasoned belief 
in its universal applicability. And yet there is inferential reason to 
believe that the wave fronts of a spherical wave of light which 
depart in opposite directions from a lighted candle with the velocity 
of light are themselves separating with the velocity of light. Here 
we have the strange result that c + c =c, where c is the velocity 
of light. Georg Cantor, whose researches on the cgntinuum has 
exerted so profound an influence upon the foundations of mathe-
matics, invented a number to count the sequence of rational points. 
This number, alephzero, if added to itself, is still no greater than 
alephzero. Here again we have an example which violates the most 
fundamental identity in mathematics. After these difficulties had 
been explained to a certain class, one of the students expressed his 
profound thankfulness that he had never wasted much time upon 
a subject in which the founders did not appear to know what 
they were talking about. One did not dare to explain to him that 
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this was, indeed, the basis of the definition of Bertrand Russell, 
who affirmed that "mathematics is the science in which we never 
know what we are talking about, nor whether what we say is true." 
And so we reach the conclusion that the principle of logic 
merely affirms that when we have defined a set of postulates, and 
then have defined a set of operations, there are inevitable conclu-
sions which may be obtained by operating with the defined opera-
tors upon those elements which satisfy the system of postulates. 
Each science as it reaches maturity attempts to reach this satis-
factory logical formulation. 
The second great principle of science is the principle of deter-
minisni. By this we mean that the elements of any science in its 
mature formulation are subject to Jaws which hold within deter-
minate limits. Even probability has its laws of chance. 
A measure of the deterministic structure of a science is the 
measure of the science. Thus, one understands from the astron-
omers that it is possible for them to mark upon the wall a small 
area and then affirm that 200 years from this very moment, if a 
telescope is pointed at that spot, the beams from the planet Jupiter 
wilJ be shining down the barrel. 
There is a story by 0. Henry which relates the adventures of a 
young man upon the Road of Destiny. The young man comes to 
a place where the road branches. Then, said 0. Henry, the young 
man took the left hand road. And down this road we follow him 
through a series of adventures at the end of which he is slain by 
an irate lover of the heroine. But fortunately, said the author, the 
story wasn't true. The young man took the right hand road. Alas, 
the story again has the same tragic ending. Well, said 0. Henry, 
we can try again since the young man really took the central road. 
Again \Ve follow him through a series of adventures and at the 
end he is finally slain under circumstances similar to those on the 
other roads. Hence there is a path of destiny and our lives, as 
all the other forms in the world of material things, are moved 
along this road by an immutable destiny. 
Now science, consciously or unconsciously, has assumed a deter-
ministic universe. Experiments performed at one time will yield 
the same results at another time within the limits of the probable 
errors. Planets move in their courses by the laws of an almost 
perfect mechanism and all science strives toward forecast. This is 
possible only under the postulate of determinism. 
This postulate is accepted without reservations in some field of 
science, but perhaps with reservations in others which deal with 
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the phenomena of life. There is at present a battle being waged 
between the proponents of the mathematical school of economics 
and those of the non-mathematical school on this very point. The 
mathematical school must inevitably contend that there are pat-
terns of human conduct which repeat themselves under identical 
conditions. Deviations from these patterns are measurable again 
in terms of deviations from the assumed conditions. The apparent 
vagaries of human conduct may be traced to imperfections of 
measurement upon the one hand, and to the complexity of condi-
tions which at all times prevail in the shifting patterns of econom-
ics, on the other. 
An interesting example of this is found in the hedonistic concept 
of what J evons has called nttility, and Pareto ophelimity, that is 
to say, the measure of satisfaction. Your actions and mine are de-
termined at all times by the relative ophelimites which we possess. 
Your pleasure in adding an increment of money to your wealth is 
proportional to the increment and inversely proportional to what 
you have. The coefficient in the ratio depends upon your per-
sonality, which may be generous, on the one hand, or miserly, on 
the other. There presumably exists an average value for this 
quantity. The question that must be answered, and which can be 
answered by inferential deductions, is whether or not the utility 
of money is of the assumed form. Many deterministic consequences 
depend upon this postulate. 
The third great principle of science is the extremnm principle. 
By this we mean that in many, if not all disciplines of science, 
there exists a fundamental quantity which nature either maximizes 
or minimizes. The most conspicuous example of this is the prin-
ciple of least action, which even Einstein left inviolate in his re-
statement of some of the laws of physics. 
The principle of least action has been employed so long as the 
basis of physics that there are perhaps many who have forgotten 
its strange metaphysical origin. Thus we find the following affirm-
ation of Leonhard Euler, the father of most mathematical theories: 
As the construction of the universe is the most perfect possible, being the 
handiwork of an all-wise Maker, nothing can be met with in the world in 
which some maximal or minimal property is not displayed. There is, con-
sequently, no doubt but that all the effects of the world can be derived by 
the method of maxima and minima from their final causes as well as from 
their efficient ones. 
Strange as it may seem this is the metaphysical origin of that 
exemplary determinism of physics, as one may see from the 
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words of Maupertuis who first stated explicity the principle of 
least action. Nature always minimizes action, which seems to us a 
much more remote concept than energy. Action is a function of 
four dimensions. A physical system always operates, says the 
principle, so that the integral of the space-time filament, multiplied 
by the differences between kinetic and potential energy, is a min-
imum. vVhy this strange behavior of nature? No one has yet 
given a satisfactory answer to the question and the pages of 
professional metaphysics do not reveal a more curious proposition 
among the philosophies. 
Historically the principle may be regarded as having been a 
generalization of Fermat's theorem that light moves so as to 
minimize time of passage from one point to another. "Since 
nature performs her operations by the most direct routes or short-
est paths, then the path of a ray of light between any two points 
must be such that the time occupied in the passage is a minimum." 
The concept of entropy is in some respects stranger than that of 
action. Nature is always attempting to maximize this mysterious 
substance, which you will recall is the integral of an increment of 
heat divided by the absolute temperature. vVhat mystery is here? 
Why should this curious entity play so fundamental a role in the 
theories of physics and chemistry? \i\Thy should it be the favored 
quantity, which nature attempts to maximize in all of its activities? 
But perhaps more interesting than these, is the question as to why 
the fatal maximum appears never to be attained. In this event, 
since entropy measures the available free energy in the universe, 
the stars would all be dark and the fatal "heat death" of Clausius 
would finally have been attained. 
Let us turn for a moment to the social problem and the new 
developments in economics. There are those, stimulated by the 
success in other fields, who have asked the question: \Vhat does 
society, regarded from the point of view of economics, try to max-
imize in its manifold activities? Several answers have been given 
to this question, and as economics grows into a natural science its 
growth will be measured in terms of the validity of its answer to 
this question. There are those who say that profits must be max-
imized, or in more formal language, man behaves in such a way 
that he attempts to maximize the integral, taken between two dates, 
of the difference between net receipts from goods sold and the 
cost of manufacturing and selling these goods. There are many 
who decry the principle of maximum profits. It seems a sordid 
and egocentric maxim for mankind to follow. The collectivist 
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theory would replace it by the principle of maximum production 
and maximum distribution of the things produced. Others would 
apply the doctrine of hedonism and maximize human satisfaction, 
measured, perhaps, by the utility function of Jevons or the ophel-
imity of Pareto. In this connection one may observe that there is 
a strange parallel between the definitions of entropy and the 
utility of money. In the first instance an increment of entropy is 
the increment of heat divided by the absolute temperature; in the 
second, an increment of money utility is the generosity coefficient 
times an increment of money, a kind of economic thermal unit, 
divided by one's absolute fortune. 
The fourth great principle of science is the principle of selection. 
By this we mean that there exists in the objects of science certain 
mechanisms, which have the power of selection and choice. This 
class includes the class of living objects, but is broader than this 
class since it also includes such objects as crystals, whose mechanism 
of growth, mysterious in many ways as life, has also the power 
of environmental selection. 
Under the cooperation of the biologists, we have often attempted 
the formulation of a system of postulates to define living things. 
To our astonishment there seems to be no way at present to define 
a categorical system of this kind. Any attribute, or collection of 
attributes, which is assumed as a postulates of life appears to be 
satisfied by equivalents from the chemical laboratory. A partic-
ularly clever biologist of my acquaintance delights in making syn-
thetic plants. If there comes to him the suggestion of a new 
postulate he immediately creates a chemical mechanism which is 
isomorphic with the new attribute. When we were once examining 
one of these synthetic plants, which grew, adapted itself to its 
environment, developed a complex structure, budded and formed 
new plants, another colleague entered the laboratory. He examined 
our little plant, but could find no postulational reason for exclud-
ing it from the realm of living things. He finally said: "Although 
I cannot now tell you why, I know that this plant is not alive." 
But where was his assurance? Was it in a naive faith in the exist-
ence of an entelechy, a power of selection, that transcended the 
mechanical powers of our little plant? 
\Ve shall not attempt a discussion of these enthralling matters 
here, but rather shall endeavor to show the relationship of the 
principle of selection to the other principles which have already 
been stated. The principle of selection is, in a certain sense, the 
antithesis of the concept of chance. The latter is a kind of nega-
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tive proposition, which asserts that certain things will follow if 
random choices are made from a random chaos. The principle of 
selection, on the contrary, affirms that by its application, order can 
be obtained from chaos, and that the laws of chance can be 
violated by it. 
For example, let four hands of bridge be dealt and spread be-
fore us. There we stand in the face of a remarkable event. Never 
before in the history of the world has that array of hands probably 
been seen nor is it likely that it will ever be seen again. The prob-
ability is approximately 1 in 54 x 1027 • But let us give the pack of 
cards to a child for him to play with. \Ve shall not wait long 
before we see upon the floor a miracle. There before us will be 
the four perfect hands arranged in neat piles. The mechanism of 
selection has accomplished what chance could never do in centuries 
of time with millions of dealing mechanisms. 
Let us look again at our law of entropy from the point of view 
of the principle of selection. The law of entropy in its most funda-
mental derivation flows out of the laws of chance. It is a kind of 
glorification of the theory of probability and rests upon the post-
ulates of that noble science. One can prove by it that heat can 
never flow upstream against a gradiant of temperature. 
But let us consider an example suggested by Clerk Maxwell. A 
box with two compartments A and B is filled with gas. In the 
compartment A the gas is hot, and in compartment B the gas is 
cold. A door between the two compartments is now opened and 
the hot gas mingles with the cold to form a mixture of average 
temperature. In the process entropy has been created and the free 
energy measured by the original differences of temperature has 
been lost forever. \Ve are one step nearer the heat death of Claus-
ius. But now let us introduce at the door between the two com-
partments a little demon, who has only one power, that of selec-
tion. A hot molecule in compartment B approaches the door and 
the demon allows it to pass into compartment A. Similarly a cold 
molecule approaches compartment B and is also allowed to pass. 
In this manner, merely by the principle of selection, compartment 
A is restored to its former temperature and compartment B to its 
former state of cold. The miracle of the ages has been performed. 
Heat has flowed uphill; the inviolate law of entropy has been 
violated; perpetual motion is a reality. 
The role of the principle of selection is now apparent. It is the 
first element in the theory of evolution, a theory which violates 
the cardinal postulates of probability. An apple orchard, deserted 
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by its cultivators, will soon revert to a wild state with sour and 
unpalatable fruit. Nature tends to level; a sort of biological en-
tropy is at work. But let the selective principle again take hold of 
the orchard and it can be restored to its former state. 
We have spoken before of the heat death of the universe, which 
must inevitably occur, but which never seems to be attained. And 
as we look into the depths of the sky we are struck by a strange 
thing. There, in certain places, we see vast red clouds of cosmic 
matter of unimaginable extent called the red giant stars such as 
Betelgeuse, Antares, Aldebaran, and the like. We know, as well 
as we can know anything in science, that these stars are but at the 
beginning of their life cycle. They will slowly decrease in size 
and by this contraction become hotter until ultimately they will be 
the most magnificent sights in the universe of stars. Then their 
energy will wane through the centuries; their magnificence will 
melt away, and they will finally disappear as insignificant reel 
dwarfs, faint shadows of their former glory. 
But the question that interests us here is, whence come these 
great giants, beginning their new life cycle? Do we see here a 
cosmic violation of the laws of entropy and is there somewhere in 
the remote regions of space a selective principle which provides the 
mechanism by which energy can be transformed into matter, and 
matter can again, under the influence of gravitation, melt away 
into radiant energy. 
Before we discuss the concluding principle, the story of Micro-
megas, as related by Voltaire, must be told. Micromegas was an 
inhabitant of Sirius who once visited the earth. As he approached 
the earth he saw a vessel upon the surface of the ocean and ap-
proached it to ascertain the nature of the inhabitants of our planet. 
He found upon the vessel a group of philosophers, who were 
arguing together and who were holding their discussion in Greek. 
The subject of their debate was the soul. And this, said Voltaire, 
was altogether fitting since "we should quote what we do not com-
prehend in a language that we do not understand." The remain-
der of this address should be given in the Greek language. 
The final principle of science we shall call the transfinite prin-
ciple. This principle is different from the rest since it has never 
been formally presented, nor does it appear to have the same ex-
perimental validity as the other principles. It is found somewhat 
imperfectly implied in one of the last papers written by the German 
mathematician, David Hilbert in a discussion of the nature of 
"Infinity." 
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By the transfinite principle, we mean that the human spirit can 
add any transfinite postulates to any set of finite postulates and any 
deductions which result will be experimentally non-contradictory. 
The first example to illustrate this point is taken from the 
writings of the illustrious astronomer De Sitter. As is known to 
many of you, De Sitter and Einstein disagreed in a very funda-
mental manner about the nature of the gravitational equations as 
they related to the universe as a whole. Einstein said that in very 
distant parts of the universe, remote from matter, space was flat. 
This meant in technical language that the matrix of the gravita-
tional potentials became unity along the main diagonal and zero 
outside the diagonal. De Sitter, on the contrary, affirmed that in 
such distant regions real space disappeared altogether and hence 
that all the gravitational potentials were zero. Let us look at the 
exact words which he used: 
"How the gravitational potentials are in those distant portions 
of space and time to which our observations have not yet pen-
etrated, we do not know, and how they are at infinity of space and 
time we shall never know. All assumptions regarding the value 
of them at infinity are therefore extrapolations which we are free 
to choose in accordance with theoretical or philosophical require-
ments." 
Now it happened that these two transfinite postulates had finite 
implications. Einstein's equations called for more matter than 
had yet been discovered in the universe. De Sitter's postulate re-
quired a shift of the spectrum of distant objects toward the red 
end of the spectrum. 
Are we to believe that it was merely a coincidence that the nature 
of the spiral nebulas, vast collections of stars like our own galaxy, 
followed upon the heels of Einstein's assumption, or that the con-
sequences of De Sitter's postulate has been amply verified by 
deeper and deeper penetrations into space? Remember that these 
consequences are deductions from mutually contradictory trans-
finite postulates. 
An even more remarkable example from many points of view is 
the debate over the foundations of the quantum theory and wave 
mechanics. Here we find the strange anomaly that light behaves in 
one way as a wave and in another as a collection of particles of 
energy. Similarly, electrons have attributes of particles, but they 
may also be diffracted like waves. What a curious mystery is here, 
where mutually contradictory attributes are observed in the same 
entities! 
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In this instance the fact preceded the explanation, but the ex-
planation is immediately seen to invoke the transfinite principle. 
Thus we observe that Heisenberg postulates a small rectangle of 
indeterminacy, wherein the laws of nature belong to a c~mplete 
chaos. Within this rectangle we may make what laws we will and 
any assumption that has finite implications should be verified by 
experiment. Schrodinger's earlier explanation was of the same 
kind, except that he threw the anomalies upon infinity. The quan-
tum theory is derived from the wave equations by assumptions 
affecting the boundary conditions of the solutions at infinity. 
The three geometri,es with which we started are again explained 
by the transfinite principle. The sums of the angles of a tria~gle 
are determined by our judgments about the nature of parallel lines, 
which carry us into postulates about infinity. If we ask astronomers 
to tell us what is true, we find that they compute for us positive, 
zero and negative parallaxes of distant stars. These we recognize 
as coinciding with the parallaxes of the three geometries. 
\Ve have now surveyed some of the great principles upon which 
science rests: The principle of logic, the principle of determinism, 
the extremum principle, the principle of selection, and the trans-
finite principle. Within their scope a large part of science can 
find its origins and its aspirations. 
In conclusion it might be well to state the scientist's personal 
creed, or at any rate, a creed which represents the highest goal of 
the scientist himself. This statement is taken from Henri Poin-
care: 
The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he studies it be-
cause he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is beautiful. If 
nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing, and if nature 
were not worth knowing, life would not be worth living. Of course I do not 
here speak of that beauty which strikes the senses, the beauty of qualities 
and of appearance; not that I undervalue such beauty, far from it, but it 
has nothing to do with science; I mean that profounder beauty which comes 
from the harmonious order of the parts, and which a pure intelligence can 
grasp. This it is which gives body, a structure so to speak, to the iridescent 
appearances which flatter our senses and without this support the beauty of 
these fugitive dreams would be only imperfect, because it would be vague 
and al ways fleeting. On the contrary, intellectual beauty is sufficient unto 
itself, and it is for its sake, more perhaps than for the future good of 
humanity, that the scientist devotes himself to long and difficult labors. 
NORTH WESTERN U NIVERSI'l'Y, 
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS. 
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